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a b s t r a c t
Using validated carving techniques, we show that popular operating systems (e.g.
Windows, Linux, and OSX) frequently have residual IP packets, Ethernet frames, and
associated data structures present in system memory from long-terminated network
traffic. Such information is useful for many forensic purposes including establishment of
prior connection activity and services used; identification of other systems present on the
system’s LAN or WLAN; geolocation of the host computer system; and cross-drive analysis.
We show that network structures can also be recovered from memory that is persisted
onto a mass storage medium during the course of system swapping or hibernation. We
present our network carving techniques, algorithms and tools, and validate these against
both purpose-built memory images and a readily available forensic corpora. These tech-
niques are valuable to both forensics tasks, particularly in analyzing mobile devices, and to
cyber-security objectives such as malware analysis.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
The value of many devices, whether personal computers,
laptops, electronic book readers, or tablets, lies in their ability
to attach to networks and communicate with other devices
and services via the Internet. Information about the networks
to which devices have connected and the communication
patterns of those devices similarly provides forensic investi-
gators a wealth of information.
For example, the set of source Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses a device has acquired over time can provide clues to
its physical network attachment points andmobility patterns.
Thedestination addresses of IP packets canprovidea picture of
commonly visited web sites, parties transferring files, and the
exchangeof email. Asa result, it is commonforensicpractice to
scavenge a subject’s device for network information and
present that information to analysts and investigators.
EthernetMedia Access Control (MAC) addresses can also be
of significant forensic value. The first three octets of an
Ethernet MAC are assigned to specific equipment vendors and
can be used to infer information about the equipment using
a particular MAC address. But the MAC addresses of other
machines on the subnet of the subject’s device can also be
revelatory. For example, MAC addresses of wireless routers
can be correlated with war-driving databases and used to
determine the physical location of a device. Themere fact that
a computer has been associated with a physical network
(either wired or wireless) can also be used to infer member-
ship in an organization or access to a physical location.
Existing forensic tools examine media, e.g. a captured hard
drive or memory stick, for email addresses, web site
addresses, and domain names. Typically these tools work by
extracting printable strings using regular expressions from
web browser caches, emailmessages, and the like. In contrast,
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our work relies on lower-layer binary network signatures such
as packet and socket data structures. These structures are
created in memory and maintained by the operating system
during the normal course of network activity. However,
network structures are not confined to memory images as
they are invariably written to fixed storage when a computer
swaps or enters system hibernation. Additionally, network
programs (e.g. domain name clients and servers, DHCP clients
and servers, etc.), may use binary network data structures
when storing configurations or caching results to the file
system, making such files useful sources of data.
To validate the potential utility of carving for binary
network data structures, we add network carving support to
the bulk_extractor toolkit (Garfinkel, in submission May 2011)
and verify our results against both disk images with known
provenance and a large research forensic corpus. On ground
truth images using checksum validation, we achieve perfect
recall (all IP addresses found), and perfect precision (no
spurious IP addresses identified).
Additionally, we find a surprising amount of discoverable
residual network information in a public corpus of approxi-
mately 1800 images. For these, where ground truth is
unknown, we show that there is a correlation between
discovered network structures and their ASCII representation
elsewhere. This dual-modality analysis adds confidence that
our approach is broadly applicable and produces correct
results.
This paper starts with a brief review of prior work in
Section 2. Next we present our validated carving technique for
IP packets and network data structures (Section 3). Section 4
presents experimental results of applying these techniques
to a variety of forensic datasets. We conclude with a discus-
sion of applications and opportunities for future work in
Section 5.
Our work is particularly valuable to forensic analysts
examining mobile devices such as laptops. Not only do
laptops frequently hibernate during their normal course of
operation, their natural mobility makes establishing connec-
tion activity and network attachment point location impor-
tant. “Smart” mobile phone handsets may similarly be
amenable to network carving; this is a subject of future
research. Finally, network carving may be useful in other
domains such as malware analysis.
2. Prior work
In this work, we broaden the scope of network forensics to
include the discovery of long-terminated network data in
memory and on fixedmedia. Whereas prior work and existing
tools are largely limited to the discovery of so-called “fully-
qualified domain names”, (e.g. www.cnn.com) and “dotted-
quad” IP addresses, (e.g. 157.166.224.26), we find significant
additional information present in the form of intact packets
and binary network data structures.
The Volatility memory analysis framework (Walters &
Petroni, February 2007) most closely parallels our effort.
Volatility can analyze the memory of live systems, memory
dumps, and entactWindows hibernation files. The framework
finds, traces, and prints a variety of memory structures from
various operating systems. Most relevant to our work is Vol-
atility’s connscan2 function, which performs limited carving
of Windows memory structures associated with TCP connec-
tions. In addition to these Windows-specific connections, our
network carver extracts and validates socket, packet, and
Ethernet frame data structures. As a result, we achieve
a significantly higher recall against ground truth data than
does Volatility.
Beyond Volatility, we find just one other reference to
“network carving” in the literaturedthe syllabus of a SANS
course (SANS, 2010) that discusses carving of web pages out of
the caches of web proxies, and carving files out of network
packet streams. We found this use of the word “carving” odd,
since tools such as tcpflow (Elson and Garfinkel, 2011) break
individual streams into their own files, performing much the
same function.
Several groups have explored searching through kernel
memory for code or data signatures. Dolan-Gavitt et al. (2009)
describe an approach for identifying kernel-mode rootkits by
searching for code signatures by are automatically generated.
Lin et al. (February 2011) present an approach findingmalware
by finding inconsistencies in signature graphs generated for
kernel data structures. Yet a third technique has been devel-
oped by Liang et al. (March 2011). However, we have found no
prior work carving IP packets or Ethernet frames out of kernel
memory or memory dumps. Originally we thought that such
carving might not be possible, as we assumed that portions of
the Ethernet and/or IP protocol would be handled in hardware
for performance reasons and not exposed to the operating
system. Instead, as we shall show, we find significant residual
binary network structure data.
Because hibernation files are an invaluable source of
network structures, it is important that we handle them
correctly. Unlike MacOS and Linux, Microsoft Windows
hibernation files are partially compressed using the Microsoft
XPress Block Memory Compression algorithm (Suiche, 2008).
Volatility implements hibernation file decompression but only
for intact hibernation files. Unfortunately, Windows corrupts
the beginning of a hibernation file when the system reboots so
that it cannot be used again. We extend Suiche’s work by
implementing an improved scanner that can detect signa-
tures associated with the start of intact Windows hibernation
pages (which may be present in a corrupt hibernation file or
located elsewhere on the hard drive as residual data from
previous hibernation files) and optimistically decompresses
them until an error occurs. As a result, our scanner is able
to process many more hibernation files than Volatility
currently can.
Garfinkel performed multi-drive correlation (“cross-drive
analysis”) using “pseudo-unique information” (actually
persistent identifiers) such as social security numbers, credit
card numbers and email addresses (Garfinkel, August 2006).
Here we extend that work by performing multi-drive correla-
tion using Ethernet MAC addresses extracted from validated
IP packets. Garfinkel (August 2007) also proposed improving
file carving by validating internal document binary structures.
We extend that work by validating structures not just for
internal consistency, but for consistency with external data-
bases (in this case, the Internet’s schema for assigning IPv4
addresses).
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Finally, our work in geolocation was assisted by geo-
location databases created by companies such as Google
(Google Mobile, 2011) and Skyhook (Skyhook, 2011).
Our hope in this work is to demonstrate the power by
network carving and to document our techniques so that they
may be incorporated into current media forensics tools.
3. Network carving
In this section we discuss the design and construction of our
network carver; the methodology to detect network signa-
tures, the network structures we extract; and the ground truth
dataset construction for verifying our carver.
3.1. Creating ground truth data
We commenced this project by creating a ground truth data-
set on which to develop our carving strategy. We started by
securely erasing all data on a machine’s hard drive and
installing a virgin copy of the operating system. Eachmachine
was then used to connect to multiple servers on our local
network and on the Internet at large. We performed file
transfers of four files of different sizes from three distinct
systems as shown in Table 1. During this period, all of the
packets entering and leaving the machine were captured
using a promiscuous recorder. We then induced the machine
to hibernate and imaged the disk. For the ground truth data,
we experimented with a variety of operating systems
including Microsoft Windows XP (service pack 3), Windows 7
professional, and Macintosh OSX 10.6.5.
3.2. Developing carving signatures
In order to develop our network carver, we require two items:
the aforementioned dataset1 and a technique to generalize
discriminatory patterns. We note that a binary IPv4 address is
nothing more than an unsigned 32-bit integer, which appears
everywhere, therefore we must rely on surrounding contex-
tual data for validation.
We started with a set of manually-derived heuristics, for
instance: “a four-byte IP address is preceded by a variable
fragment field and a protocol field equal to six (TCP)”. Mir-
roring prior research in named entity extraction (Nadeau,
2007), we found that such heuristics are brittle, difficult to
define, and often inaccurate.
To develop better heuristics we wrote an exploratory
program that searched for the byte patterns of our known IP
addresses and computed the frequency of the n-gram byte
patterns preceding and following the addresses at various
offsets within a specified window. We then crafted new
carvers using these signatures. Finally we re-processed our
hibernation files with these signatures, tabulating all of the IP
addresses that were discovered.
For performance measures, we term a true positive (TP) as
a discovered IP address from Table 1, a false positive (FP) as an
address that was not from that table or the host computer,
and a false negative (FN) as an address in the table that is not
discovered.We use standardmetrics of precision (TP/(TPþ FP))
and recall (TP/(TP þ FP)), and manually tuned our algorithms
using the selection of n-grams.
As an illustrative example, we performed numerous
network connections from Windows, Linux, and OSX work-
stations to the destination address 172.20.104.199, suspended
the machine and captured its hibernation file. We then
scanned memory for the hex sequence corresponding to this
address (0xAC1468C7). Recall that the IP source and destina-
tion addresses occur 12 and 16 bytes into an IP packet (Postel,
September 1981). Next we computed the frequency distribu-
tion of the two-byte grams within a fixed 20 byte window
surrounding the address. Table 2 shows the most frequent 2-
grams from this analysis.
We observe that the most frequent 2-gram preceding an IP
address is 0x4000 which, upon manual inspection, appears in
the IP flags field and indicates that the “don’t fragment bit” is
set. Next are 0x0800 and 0xF202, the trailing bytes of the
Ethernet (Hornig, April 1984) link-layer encapsulation of the IP
packet (0x0800 is the Ethernet type field indicating an IP
packet while 0xF202 is the last two bytes of the source
Ethernet address). As we set out to discover IP packets, finding
Ethernet structures is one demonstration of the power of the
frequency analysis approach. We use this discovery to carve
Ethernet addresses in x3.3.
0x4508 and 0x4500 indicate the start of an IP version 4
packet with the type of service bits set or cleared (the ssh
secure shell file transfer sessions have this bit set). The 0x4006
represents an IP TTL of 64 (0x40) and protocol TCP (0x06). The
fact that 0xF202, 0x4006, and 0x4508 all have the same
frequency is relevant and represent 368 Ethernet encapsu-
lated TCP/IP packets with TTL of 64 and type of service bits set.
Similar analysis with different search addresses and
different n-gram sizes reveal additional clues for choosing
Table 1 e Ground truth flows. Each flowwas downloaded
from the specified address using either HTTP or SCP.
File Size Host
Small 10 kB 18.26.0.230
Medium 100 kB 18.9.22.69
Large 1 MB 128.30.2.134
Huge 10 MB 18.26.1.76
Table 2 e IP 2-gram analysis.
Predecessor freq Successor freq
Count 2-gram Count 2-gram
434 0x4000 428 0x0016
421 0x0800 426 0x0447
368 0xF202 412 0x0A79
368 0x4006 374 0xAC14
368 0x4508 374 0x694A
368 0x0017 41 0x0000
66 0x4500 12 0x2000
. . . .
1 A product of this research is the creation of disk images with
known ground truth that will be contributed to an existing
forensic corpus (Garfinkel et al., August 2009).
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discriminating features. For example, the most frequent 8
byte successor gram that is common across different target
addresses is all zeros. This detail supported our decision to
scan for socket network address structures (struct sock-
addr_in), as precisely eight sequential zero bytes is somewhat
unusual in memory dumps.
Although it is possible to take the results of our n-gram
study and use this to train amachine learning algorithm, such
an approach would train the system on both the structure of
our data (the IP packets) as well as the content (the actual data
being sent over the network connection). We believe that
instead our manual approach to feature selection results in
a scanner that is more accurate, since it relies on expert data
that is unavailable to the naı¨ve machine learning algorithm.
3.3. Methodology
On the basis of the preceding signature analysis, we created
a new module (scan_net) for bulk_extractor, an open source
forensic tool. This scanner carves the following data
structures:
" IP Packets: As depicted in Fig. 1, we identify a potential IP
packet as having a first byte of 0x45 (IP version 4 and
a standard header length), a flags and offset field of 0x0000
or 0x4000 and a protocol of either 0x06 or 0x11 (TCP or UDP).
When possible, we verify the IP-level packet checksum.
" Socket structures: We find socket structures in the form
shown in Fig. 2 and specified in netinet/in.h. An address
family of 0x02 (Internet) and port precedes the remote
address. Eight bytes of zero follow. Note that because long
strings of zero bytes are common on disk, socket structures
generate the most false positives. An analysis of the theo-
retical false positive rate is provided in x4.1.
" Windows: TCPT Microsoft Windows platforms maintain
TCP-specific connection structures. We adopt the func-
tionality in Volatility’s connscan by scanning for the four-
byte signature 0x54455054 (“TCPT”) with the correct pool
size, and then interpreting the following 28 bytes as
a _TCPT_OBJECT.
" Ethernet: The most common link-layer technologies are 802.3
Ethernet and 802.11 wireless, both of which include globally
unique six-byte hardware MAC addresses. Many of the IP
packets we discover while carving are encapsulated in an
Ethernet frame2.Thebest signature is0x0800, Ethernet IP type
(Hornig, April 1984), followed by the beginning of an IP packet
(Fig. 3). Recovering Ethernet MAC addresses enables addition
inferences, as there now exist databases of wireless router
MAC addresses Such databases, (e.g.wigle.net; Skyhook) and
other war-driving collections, can be used to accurately geo-
locate where the computer was previously used.
In practice, carving for all of these various binary network
structures proves valuable. For instance, the previously
available technique of discovering Windows TCPT structures
accounts for only 1% of the discovered IP address instances on
our selected ground truth data.
Second,many hosts, particularly those found in residential
installations, are given a private IP address (Rekhter et al.,
February 1996) and use some form of network address trans-
lation (NAT). The NAT maps the private local address to
a globally routeable Internet address. Unfortunately, a private
IP address effectively hides the network attachment point of
the host. In these instances, the discovery of the source
Ethernet MAC addresses can be vitaldfor example, by con-
necting a piece of seized media to a specific home router.
3.4. Validating IP addresses
As shown in x4.1, our signatures have a low, but non-
negligible analytic false positive rate. In practice the false
positive rate can be higher as the prior probability of any given
byte is not uniform, and the probabilities of individual bytes
are not independent. To cope with false positives, we imple-
ment several techniques for validating IP address hits.
" Checksums: IP packets provide a means of self-validation by
including a checksum over the IP header (Braden et al.,
September 1988). Where possible, we validate that
a correct checksum exists for all discovered IP packets.
Unfortunately, we cannot exclude occurrences of invalid
checksums as modern hardware performs checksum off-
loading (Chase et al., April 2001) as a performance optimi-
zation. In many cases, garbage or zero bytes are passed by
the operating system to the physical network card which
then computes the checksum in hardware for transmission
on the wire. On our ground truth data, we find approxi-
mately 18% of discovered IP address instances have an
invalid checksum while the remaining 82% validate. The
addresses with invalid checksums are all false positives,
suggesting that on our particular hardware, checksum bytes
are passed from the hardware to the operating system.
" Filtering: A second means of validation is to identify bogus
addresses. IP addresses are allocated in a structured, hier-
archical manner (Hubbard et al., November 1996). While an
IP address is nothing more than an unsigned 32-bit integer,
many IP addresses are reserved (e.g. 127.0.0.0/8), invalid (e.g.
240.0.0.0/4), or simply unlikely (e.g. 224.0.0.0/4). Even more
importantly, many addresses allocated to providers are not
announced in the global BGP routing tables (Rekhter et al.,
January 2006). As such, we take the global routing table as
aggregated from many vantage points in the Routeviews
project (Meyer, 2010) and filter addresses which do not
appear in the table.
" Frequency analysis: We compute a histogram of the IP
addresses that are found in the carved data structures. IP
addresses that appear more frequently are more likely to be
the result of actual operating system activity and less likely
to be the result of random matching. To this end, we
configure bulk_extractor to create a histogram of recovered IP
addresses, TCP connections, and Ethernet MAC addresses.
" Correlation between modalities: Lastly, correlation using
different methods builds confidence in an inference. IP
addresses that are found in both IP packets and socket
structures are more likely to be IP addresses from prior
traffic than IP addresses recovered via just one modality.2 We did not, however, find any instances of ARP packets.
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As indicated above, all of these techniques can be used to
increase confidence in a specific IP or Ethernet address. When
conducting triage operations, the analyst may find that it is
useful to use confidence to prioritize the effort applied to each
address. On the other hand, when performing an in-depth
analysis, it may be more productive to investigate every
confirmed and potential address that is recovered from the
media.
3.5. Local versus remote addresses
The histogram of IP addresses from IP packets provides
valuable insight into the previous connection patterns of the
device in question, but does not differentiate between
address(es) used by the subject device, i.e. the local source
address, and those of remote systems.
As one step to identify the device’s source address, we
observe that IP packets can leak valuable information
(Beverly, April 2004). We utilize the IP time-to-live (TTL)
parameter of packets to determine if they were originated by
the system, or received from a remote system. In particular, IP
routers decrement the TTL field of each packet while oper-
ating systems set the initial TTL of outgoing IP packets in
powers of two (the most typical values being 64, 128, and 255).
Because packets originating from the local host will not have
encountered any routers, and hence not had the TTL field
decremented, we can expect their TTL to be a power of two.
We use this power-of-two trick to label IP addresses
discovered via carving as local or remote.We can also use this
trick to determine the distance, measured in router hops, of
the packet source. To do sowe use thewell-knownheuristic of
selecting the next-highest power of two as the originating
0x00000000




Fig. 2 e Carving sockets: The white bytes provide a signature for the struct sockaddr network socket structure. While the
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Fig. 1 e Carving IP packets: The white bytes provide a signature for a likely IP packet (pðfalse positiveÞx2L30). Some
hardware and operating systems preserve the IP checksum (in green), providing an improved means to validate the packet
on some hardware configurations. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to
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Discovered Ethernet Address
Discovered Ethernet Address
Fig. 3 e Carving Ethernet: The white bytes provide a signature for a likely Ethernet structure, including an Ethernet IP type
(Hornig, April 1984) and first byte of IP. Ethernet addresses are especially valuable for forensics as they are unique and
attributable.
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TTL. If the observed TTL is greater than 128 we infer an orig-
inal TTL of 255 and if less than 32 we infer 32.
Local and remote addresses can also be directly distin-
guished by the presence of addresses in struct sockaddr
structures, if they are present.
3.6. Hibernation decompression
Because network data structures are typically created in
system memory, we naturally find significant amounts of
network information contained in hibernation files. Micro-
soft Windows hibernation files compress some of the
hibernated memory pages, implying that decompression can
yield better carving recall and performance. Unfortunately,
Windows overwrites the beginning of hibernation files when
it resumes from hibernation. As the beginning of the file
contains memory map information critical for reassembly,
overwriting makes existing hibernation systems (e.g.Walters
and Petroni, February 2007; Suiche, 2008) fail. Furthermore,
there may exist fragments of previously-used hibernation
files present in the unallocated areas of a hard drive if the
user erased the HIBERFIL.SYS and the file was later recreated
by the operating system; existing systems cannot decom-
press such fragments.
Fortunately, the beginning of each page of the Windows
memory map that is compressed using the XPress
compression algorithm is preceded with a 32-byte header
containing an 8-byte signature of 0x81 0x81 0x78 0x70 0x72
0x65 0x73 0x73 and three bytes (a, b, c) from which the
length of the compressed buffer can be decoded using
equation (1):
length ¼ a& 8þ b& 16þ c& 24
1024
þ 1 (1)
We implement a Windows hibernation scanner and decom-
pression pipeline in the bulk_extractor framework using
a modified version of Suiche’s source code.
Decompression improves the IP address hit recall by an
order of magnitude. Table 3 shows the frequency of IP
addresses discovered with and without hibernation decom-
pression enabled for one of our ground truth data systems. All
of the addresses are known to be valid, as they represent
known flows from our exploratory ground truth data image.
Whereas in compressed form the most frequently carved IP
address is 18.26.0.230, the systems’ true source IP address
(172.20.105.74) becomes the most commonly found IP address
following decompression.
4. Experimental results
In this section, we apply the aforementioned techniques to
both our ground-truth data corpus and a large, public corpus
in order to better understand the potential of our approach.
First, however, we derive the expected false positive rate on
random data for baseline comparison.
4.1. Theoretical false positive rate
If we define a hit in our carving as amatch of a specifiedm fixed
bytes from a window of N bytes, the probability of a false posi-
tive against a uniformly distributed randomN bytes is 2'8m. For
example, if we hit on IP packets by finding a leading 0x45 (IP
version 4 and header length 5), an offset of 0x0000 or 0x4000
(noneor “don’t fragment”), andaprotocol of0x06or0x11 (TCPor
UDP), we find: P (IP false positive)¼ 2'30. Thus, on randomdata,
wewill generateapproximatelyone falsepositiveperGBofdata.
Because we match on eight bytes of zeros and a byte of
family in struct sockaddr, we expect a 2'72 chance of gener-
ating a false hit with this second approach. In reality, disks
frequently contain long strings of zeros, effectively reducing
our rate to: pðsockaddr false positiveÞx2'8(pðtransÞ, where
p(trans) is the probability of a transition between a run of 8
zero bytes and a region of non-zero bytes.
Finally, the probability of generating a false positive using
only IP checksums (Braden et al., September 1988) against
randomly generated IP packets is relatively high: 2'16. To see
this, note that the IP checksum uses the 1’s compliment of
two-byte words in the IP header. Therefore, a random
ensemble of nine two-byte words generates a randomly
drawn two-byte word which must match the checksum field.
Thus, there is a one in 216 chance of a match at random (Stone
et al., October 1998).
4.2. Comparison with volatility
Our first performance experiment concerns the ability to
discover additional network information beyond that inferred
by Volatility. We created a fresh install of Windows XP in our
controlled environment. We then performed the large file
transfer while using an external packet capture device. Once
the transfer completed, we manually hibernated the machine
and retrieved the hibernation file from the disk. Running
Volatility against this image using “connscan2” found no
addresses or connections, while our binary network carving
technique discovered both the host’s source IP address and
the remote destination.
For additional external validation, we compared our tool
against Volatility on the NIST CFReDS (NIST) memory images.
These images are labeled with the destinations to which the
browser had been pointed. Whereas Volatility does not find
a network connection to the web site w3.org, our technique
discovers a residual IP packet.
4.3. Against ground truth data
Next, we examine the performance of our scanner against the
ground truth images we previously created. In all instances,
Table 3 eWindows hibernation file decompression: by
implementing a per-fragment decompression algorithm,
we significantly improve IP address carving recall.
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across all operating systems,we are always able to retrieve the
machine’s local IP address. Table 4 shows the precision of
network carving using only high-confidence and all addresses.
We label an IP address as a true positive when it is discovered
and also appears in the captured packet trace. Similarly,
a false positive is one that we discover, but does not appear in
the packet trace. The precision of the validated, high-
confidence addresses is quite high. Not only are the host’s
source IP address and the HTTP transfer destination addresses
discovered, we are typically able to discovermany of the other
machines in the subnet that are sending broadcasts, for
instance Windows file sharing.
4.4. Against real data corpus
Having validated our methodology, we apply our network
carving to 1817 images in the Real Data Corpus (Garfinkel
et al., August 2009). Note that this corpus contains images
from not only general purpose computers, but also from
digital cameras, music players, etc. Specifically, using oper-
ating system inference techniques, 335 images are a version of
Windows. Of the 1817 images, we discover IP addresses on 723
(x40%). Those images in which no IP addresses are found
have been excluded from this analysis.
Unlike the controlled dataset, we have only limited ground
truth over the images in the larger corpus. To ascertain how
representative are these discovered IP addresses, we correlate
them against discovered dotted-quads as represented in
ASCII. We expect some degree of correlation as a host’s
address will often appear in configuration files, logs, caches,
etc. that are found in the natural course of carving by
bulk_extractor.
Fig. 4 shows a scatter plot for the drives. On the typical
drive there are significantly more IP addresses that can be
found from the ASCII than from network carving, and the
number of addresses that correlate varies considerably per
drive.
Notice that there are between one and two orders of
magnitude more IP addresses from ASCII carving than by
network carving. This is not just because network carving
finds relatively few IP addressesdit is because state-of-the-art
ASCII IP address carving techniques search for IP addresses
using regular expressions, and thus generate a significant
number of false positives from software version numbers,
numbers in spreadsheets, and other sources. In contrast
network carving, especially from IP packets with valid
checksums, generates high-quality IP addresses with a negli-
gible false-positive rate.
We find an average of 2258 IP addresses in ASCII and 21 IP
addresses via binary network structure carving per drive
(respectively a standard deviation of 19,635 and 52). On 66 of
the drives, we find validated IP addresses via network carving
that do not appear elsewhere in ASCII form.
For a given image i, let the correlation factor ci be the
fraction of IP addresses found in network structures that are
also found in ASCII form elsewhere in the image. Fig. 5 shows
the cumulative distribution of the 723 images as a function of
c. We analyze two cases, first the correlation factor for all
discovered IPs and second the correlation for IPs with
a frequency greater than one. From the Figure, we see that for
approximately 50% of the images, none of the IP addresses
discovered in network structures are found in ASCII.
However, around 20% of the images have a ci ) 0.2, indi-
cating that for these images of only partially known prove-
nance, there is correlation between our method and
a completely different analysis.
Looking a bit more deeply, we determine the difference in
correlation between IP addresses discovered within IP versus
socket structures. Fig. 6 shows that x53% of images contain
none of the socket addresses elsewhere. However, the corre-
lation is much stronger for addresses discovered within IP
structures where there is some correlation for 74% of the
images. In fact, for IP structures, 50% of the images have
ci ) 0.5, indicating a strong correlation.
Thus, there are high-confidence IP addresses (thosewe find
through correlation between modalities) and lower-
confidence IP addresses (those which are found using
a single modality). Depending on the importance of a disk and
a target, an analyst might go after only the high-confidence IP
addresses or might go after all of them.
Finally, we examine the file source of IP addresses discov-
ered in the corpus. For 10% of the 723 images where we
discovered addresses, one of the IPs was found in the hiber-
fil.sys Windows hibernation file while 2% were in the
Table 4 eWindows 7 ground truth performance.





Fig. 4 e Correlation between scanning modalities across
723 images in the corpus. Each circle corresponds to
a single hard drive, where the X axis indicates the number
of addresses found through binary carving, the Y axis
indicates the number of addresses found by ASCII carving,
and the size of the circle indicates the number of addresses
that are the same.
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WIN386.SWP Windows swap file. However, fully 58% of the
images had discovered IP addresses that could not be attrib-
uted to any file as inferred by the file system data.
There are severalmechanisms that could result inmemory
from hibernation and swap files being deposited into unallo-
cated regions of the hard drive for which there is no corre-
sponding file:
" After the WIN386.SWP is expanded by Windows, the file
may be fragmented. When the file is later defragmented,
some sectors may be mapped out of the file without being
overwritten.
" Users may intentionally delete the hibernation file in an
effort to recover disk space. Once deleted, the information in
the sectors will remain until they are overwritten. If the
system creates a new hibernation file, it is unlikely to
occupy the same sectors.
" Other processes may result in memory being written to disk
in user files that are then later deleted, leaving the memory
behind as residual data.
Our experience in finding network artifacts in unallocated
regions of the hard drive that are not associated with swap-
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Fig. 5 e Correlation between scanning modalities across 723 images in the corpus: cumulative distribution of the fraction of
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struct IP
struct sockaddr
Fig. 6 e Difference in IP correlation between addresses discovered in IP versus socket structures across 723 images in the
corpus.
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amounts of valuable information from ephemeral stores (e.g.
swap) is available only by examining the entire drive, and not
restricting examination to the hiberfil.sys and WIN386.SWP
files.
4.4.1. Geolocation
We scanned the NPS Real Data Corpus and found a total of
11,823 unique Ethernet MAC addresses on 74 drives. Of these
addresses, the majority of them (11,355) were multicast
addresses (as indicated by the 01:00:5E prefix Deering,
August 1989), leaving 468 addresses associated with actual
physical interfaces. We extracted these physical MAC
addresses and attempted to run them through the Wigle,
Skyhook and Google geolocation databases. We were not
able to find any of the MAC addresses in the Wigle database.
Skyhook told us that using their database in this manner
was a violation of their terms-of-service. We were unable to
find any of the addresses using Google’s API, but we were
never sure that it was operating properly due to the lack of
error codes.
Our lack of success with this database should not be
taken as evidence that the technique does not work, as the
Wigle database is very sparse and the drives in the Real Data
Corpus were primarily located in areas with little coverage
by the Skyhook or Google databases. Nevertheless, it is
evidence that a significant effort needs to be undertaken in
building a comprehensive MAC address database before it
can be successfully used to geolocate disk images in this
fashion.
We had more luck performing Geolocation on extracted IP
addresses. Partially this is because IP addresses are allocated
in blocks and follow a typology. Using this information geo-
location services are able to provide a physical location for
virtually every publicly routable IP addressdalthough
certainly some of the reported locations are less accurate than
others.
Images in the Real Data Corpus are generally tagged with
the country in which they were acquired. Using this infor-
mation as ground truth, we explored our ability to infer the
origin of images on the basis of discovered IP addresses. In
particular, we discover IP addresses on 30 images from India, 5
images fromMexico, 28 images from Israel, and 6 images from
China. For each image, we use MaxMind to geolocate each
discovered IP address and then infer the origin to be the most
frequent country.
Using this approach, we achieve accuracies of 64%, 50%,
40%, and 23% for Israel, China, Mexico, and India respectively.
However, we note that the most frequent mis-classification is
the United States which has a large concentration of servers
and infrastructure to which hosts from all over the world
access, particularly those in less developed countries. This
analysis therefore provides further validation against the
larger corpus by confirming that the carved IP addresses
represent real residual network traffic.
4.4.2. Cross-drive analysis with MAC addresses
Using the method outlined by Garfinkel (August 2006), we
performed a multi-drive correlation of all 11,823 unique
Ethernet MAC.
Our multi-drive correlation was able to identify several
cases of computers in the NPS corpus having the same
Ethernet MAC address present on their hard drive. We were
able to identify 16 Ethernet MAC addresses that were present
on more than one disk image. Treating both the MAC
addresses and disk images as nodes in a graph and the pres-
ence of an address on an image as a link, we were able to
partition the collection of disk images into eight distinct
clusters (Table 5 and Fig. 7). Clusters #1, #2, and #3 all corre-
spond to sets of drives that were removed from service at
three different organizations in India and then resold on the
secondary market, giving evidence that multi-drive correla-
tion can be used to infer network membership.
Cluster #4 is somewhat confusing, as it contains three
computers from India, one from Israel and one from the Pal-
estinian Authority. However, the Ethernet prefix 01-00-5E is
the Ethernet IPv4Multicast prefix, and not an Ethernet address
associated with a physical device. Indeed, a Google search for
the Ethernet Mac address “01-00-5E-7F-FF-FA” we conducted
in January 2011 resultedmore than 52,000 hits, demonstrating
that the address iswidely used and thus not suitable formulti-
drive correlation.
We have no explanation for Cluster #5, which appears to
correlate a disk acquired in Israel with one acquired inMexico.
The Ethernet prefix 00-E0-D0 is allocated to the NetSpeed
corporation, a company that was acquired by Cisco in 1999; it
is possible that more than one machine is using that Ethernet
MAC address.
Cluster #6 groups a computer from the Palestinian
Authority with two computers from Israel. This may be a false
match; then again, it may not be.
Table 5eUsing EthernetMAC addresses formulti-drive correlation resulted in eight partitions. The social network graph of
these MAC addresses and disk images is presented in Fig. 7.
Cluster MAC addresses Disk images in cluster
1 00-0E-90-D5-E6-5E 00-16-76-A2-60-6E 00-1B-B9-9B-D3-61 00-1B-B9-9B-D5-BB
00-1B-B9-9C-47-67 00-1E-90-D5-EE-5E 00-1E-90-DE-F1-07 00-1E-A6-01-9E-3A
IN10-0009 IN10-0010 IN10-0047 IN10-0048
IN10-0049 IN10-0050 IN10-0051 IN10-52
2 00-16-76-A2-60-6E IN10-0413 IN10-0414
3 00-04-ED-66-C7-19 00-26-18-BD-D9-E9 IN10-0561 IN10-0562
4 01-00-5E-7F-FF-FA IL38 IN10-0014 IN10-0095 IN10-0118 PS01-021
5 00-E0-D0-13-14-94 il42 mx5-30
6 00-50-04-EE-6C-F9 ps01-036 il02 il04
7 00-05-5F-EF-14-01 00-15-F2-4B-E5-1E th01-01 cn20-01
8 00-D0-B7-69-0A-41 cn4-06 DE-1039
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Cluster #7 matches a computer from Thailand with
a computer from China with twoMAC addresses, one assigned
to Cisco Systems, one assigned to ASUSTek.
Cluster #8matches a computer fromChinawith a computer
from Germany.
We believe that this very preliminary evaluation demon-
strates the power of using MAC addresses for cross-drive
analysis.
5. Conclusions
We have shown that IP packets and network data structures
from memory are frequently persisted onto mass storage
devices as a result of system hibernation and virtual memory.
We have developed a tool that can be used to automatically
extract this information.
5.1. Code availability
We have incorporated our code into the current release of
bulk_extractor. The network carving code is enabled by default
in version 1.0.
5.2. Future work
This initial work suggests many avenues for future research.
We wish to investigate the extent to which residual network
information can be better categorized and filtered to recon-
struct network activities of interest. For instance, consider the
Fig. 7 e The social network graph of the table presented in Table 5. Squares indicate nodes, ovals indicate MAC addresses.
Line width is proportional to the number of times that each MAC address was found on each node. This graph was
generated automatically by running bulk_extractor on a set of 1800D disk images, processing the resulting carved Ethernet
addresses with a multi-disk correlation program, and sending the results to the GraphViz (Gansner and North, 2000) circo
program for drawing. No human intervention was required for the selection of the graph nodes or the drawing of the links.
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